Foreword: Is Reliance Still Dead?

RANDY E. BARNETI*

This just in: Generalissinw Francisco Franco is still dead.
Chevy Chase, Saturday Night Live, circa 1975
One thing I found out when I was a prosecutor is that you should
never tell a police officer he cannot do something, for that just serves as
an open invitation for him to do it. In recent years, I have learned a
similar lesson about legal scholarship which I should probably keep to
myself but won't. If you proclaim the existence of a scholarly
"consensus," this is an open invitation for academics to try to demolish
such a claim.
In 1996, I published an article entitled The Death of Reliance; based
on a talk I gave at the annual meeting of the Association of American
Law Schools on recent trends in legal scholarship. In it I claimed there
then existed a "new consensus" that a "reliance theory" did not explain
the doctrine of promissory estoppe1.1 What exactly a ''reliance theory" is
has never been made clear by those who seemed to advocate it-apart
from their insistence that, just as tort law rectified the harm caused by
physical misconduct, the purpose of contract law was to rectify
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1. Randy E. Barnett, The Death of ReliaJIce, 46 J. LEGAL Eouc. 518 (1996).
2. That same year, I identified another "new consensus" in an article that has
provoked a similar adverse reaction. See Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire:
The New Consensus on the Second Amendment, 45 EMORY LJ. 1139 (1996).
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detrimental reliance caused by verbal misconduct.
This claim entails that reliance must exist before there should be any
recovery (thereby calling into question the propriety of enforcing
executory agreements), and that the normal measure of damages should
be the "reliance interest" (thereby calling into question the propriety of
awarding the "expectation interest"). Moreover, if the heart of this cause
of action was induced detrimental reliance, then whether or not the
promisor intended to be legally bound by her promise, or manifested
such an intent to the promisee, and whether or not the promisee
reasonably believed the promise to be legally binding were wholly
immaterial. All this was much debated by contracts scholars in the
1960s and 1970s.
The "death of reliance" of which I wrote was based on the fact that, by
the 1980s and 1990s, most contracts scholars who had written in any
depth on the subject had concluded on the basis of comprehensive case
analyses that: (a) the existence of detrimental reliance was not sufficient
to explain when a promissory estoppel action would succeed and (b) the
existence of detrimental reliance was not necessary for an action based
4
on promissory estoppel to succeed.
As to the ftrst claim it was shown that a claimant needed "reliance
plus something" to prevail in a promissory estoppel action and,
therefore, a "reliance theory" of promissory estoppel could not, standing
alone, explain what this "something" might be. As to the second claim,
some scholars found that courts were enforcing serious, but
nonbargained-for, promises in a business context even in the absence of
any provable detrimental reliance. In addition I noted that some
scholars, though not yet a consensus, had begun questioning whether the
"reliance interest" should ever be a proper measure of contract damages,
even as a fallback recovery when the expectation interest cannot, for
some reason, be computed with adequate certainty.s
3. See Barnett, supra note 1, at 518-22 (describing "the rise and fall of reliance").
See also Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 27477 (1986) (discussing reliance theories and their weaknesses).
4. See Barnett, supra note 1, at 522-27 (describing "the new consensus"). There
I discussed or cited the following works: Randy E. Barnett & Mary E. Becker, Beyolld
Reliallce: Promissory Estoppel, Contract Formalities, and Misrepresentations, IS
HOFSlRA L. REv. 443 (1987); Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyolld
Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake, " 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
903 (1985); Juliet P. Kostritsky, A New Theory of Assent-Based Liability Emerging
Under the Guise of Promissory Estoppel: An Explanation and Defense, 33 WAYNE L.
REv. 895 (1987); Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101
YALEL.J. 111 (1991).
5. In my article, I cited Michael B. Kelly, The Phantom Reliance Interest ill
Contract Damages, 1992 WIS. L. REv. 1755. Since I wrote, Kelly has been joined in
this general opinion by David W. Barnes, The Net Expectation Interest ill Contract
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All this led me to conclude that, as a theory of promissory estoppel,
reliance was dead. I did not claim, I hasten to add, that promissory
estoppel was dead or dying.6 This was never even suggested by the
scholarship I was reporting, nor have I ever contended that reliance was
unimportant as a goal of contractual enforcement. To the contrary, I
distinguished between ''the tort-like conception of contract in which the
inducement of detrimental reliance mal be held to justify a remedy to
compensate for the detriment incurred" from the quite different concern
that "contracts are viewed as protecting one party's right to rely on the
commitment of another."s That the protection and facilitation of reliance
was an important function of contract law was never at issue in this
debate. Rather, the "new consensus" scholars denied the claim made
during the 1960s and 1970s that a reliance principle could explain the
doctrine of promissory estoppel and even supplant altogether the
traditional requirement of bargained-for consideration.
The reaction to this thesis was pretty s\vift as scholarly reactions go,
and far surpassed the reaction to the underlying scholarship I had been
summarizing and reporting. (Lesson number 2: asserting the existence
of a scholarly "consensus" is an excellent way to get yourself cited if it
ticks off enough people.) Most notably challenged was claim (b): that
the existence of reliance was no longer a necessary element of
promissory estoppel. This was effectively refuted by a study of
Damages, 48 EMORY L.J. 1137 (1999). Both authors are contributors to this Symposium.
in which the challenges they have made to the ''reliance interest of contrnct damages" are
both expanded and critically evaluated.
6. Professor Charles Knapp has apparently misinterpreted my claim in precisely
this way. See Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: Tile Perils of Promissory Estoppel.
49 HAsTINGS Ll. 1191. 1244 (1998) (referring to "Professor Barnett's death notice for
promissory estoppel"); id. at 1245 (referring to "earlier writers [who] have surveyed the
case law and reported that promissory estoppel is dead" and citing to The Deatil of
Reliance). Eric Mills Holmes, on whom Professor Knapp then relies to refute this
alleged claim. understood that this was not the thesis of my earlier work with Mary
Becker, supra note 4, on promissory estoppel. See Eric Mills Holmes, Tile Four Phases
of Promissory Estoppel, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 45, 46 n.5 (1996). Holmes misinterprets
our article in a different way, however. We were not "courteously allow[ing) the
doctrine to rest in the shadowlands of tort and contrnct" Id. at 46. Rather, we tried to
remove promissory estoppel from the shadow lands by categorizing a large part of the
doctrine as lying squarely within contrnct law, and a smaller part lying squarely within
tort. In contrast, in his important article (that appeared around the same time as The
Death of Reliance), Holmes contends that "promissory estoppel is promissory estoppel."
an equitable fonn of relief that sits on its own bottom. Id. at 48.
7. Barnett, supra note 1, at 522.
8. [d.
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promissory estoppel cases by Robert Hillman in which he found that the
absence of reliance was dispositive in 25% of the cases in which
9
promissory estoppel claims were denied. These data certainly support
the conclusion that a reliance requirement for recovery in promissory
estoppel does indeed exist and, in this regard at least, reliance is not
dead.
But Hillman's study also suggested that the existence of a promise
was as necessary as detrimental reliance to a promissory estoppel action.
In 135 cases (50%) a defect in the promise was discussed while in 52 of
these cases (19% of the total cases surveyed) reliance was not
discussed.1O As Hillman notes: ''The result here should not be surprising
if both promise and reliance are prerequisites for recovery on promissory
estoppel grounds.,,11 In one sense, this seems unremarkable. Section 90
of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts always said that a promise was
needed for promissory estoppel. Indeed, section 90 does not use the
term "promissory estoppel" at all, speaking instead of "Promise
Reasonably Inducing Action or Forbearance.,,12 For that matter, though
it explicitly refers to "a promise," the Restatement does not actually use
the term "reliance"-instead referring to promises that "induce action or
forbearance on the part of the promisee.,,1
But though it should have come as no surprise that the existence of a
promise was still a requirement of promissory estoppel, this finding still
undercut the old 1960s and 1970s "reliance theory" of promissory
estoppel in which reliance on any verbal conduct was to be treated like a
form of a verbal tort. According to this approach, Hoffman v. Red Owl
Stores, Inc. 14 was the harbinger of bigger things to come. The court in
Red Owl had dispensed with the requirement that it actually enforce a
promise of a franchise made by the defendant. In the much heralded
words of the Red Owl court in response to the objection that
the "promise" was not definite enough to merit ordinary
contractual enforcement: "We deem it would be a mistake to regard an
action grounded on promissory estoppel as the equivalent of a breach-ofcontract action."IS
This was taken to signal that promissory estoppel was not the
"substitute for consideration" that Samuel Williston explicitly, and the

9. Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the "New Consensus" on Promissory
Estoppel: An Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 580, 600 (1998).
10. [d. at 599 n.87.
11. Id. at 601.
12. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
13. [d.
14. 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
15. [d. at 275.
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Restatements implicitly, conceived it to be: That is, it was not merely a
substitute for a nonexistent bargain in fmding enforceability of a
promise that otherwise met all the normal requirements of a contract.
Rather, it was a different beast altogether and one that, if properly fed
and nurtured, could grow to supplant the bargain theory of consideration
entirely. In place of a requirement of reciprocal inducement, by which
we establish enforceability and all the other formal requirements by
which we assess the existence of assent, would be an omnibus cause of
action based upon injuries caused by reliance on the verbal conduct of
others, in the same way that tort law compensates for injuries caused by
the physical conduct of others. Contracts would not themselves die
away, but contract law with its basic principle that contractual duties
were the creation of consenting parties would be supplanted by tort law
that imposes duties on people whether or not they consent.
Extolling very rare judicial statements in such cases as Red Owl,
progressive contracts scholars lobbied for what Grant Gilmore colorfully
called the "Death of Contract.,,·7 And it was this campaign of the 1960s
and 1970s that provoked the "new consensus" scholarship debunking the
role of reliance. Significantly, as was just seen in the data presented by
Professor Hillman, the recent reaction to this "new consensus"
scholarship has not undermined the importance of promise:! To the
contrary, it has reinforced it. Nor has it undermined the claim that the
existence of detrimental reliance alone is not sufficient to support an
action of promissory estoppel. For one thing, a promise is also required,
but more than that may also be necessary.
In an important article published almost simultaneously with
Hillman's, Sidney DeLong presented the results of his survey of a
similarly massive number of promissory estoppel cases over
19
substantially the same time period. His study confirmed Hillman's
finding that detrimental reliance remained a necessary element of an
action for promissory estoppel,20 and to that extent at least the "new
16. See s. WUllSTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 139, llt 307 (l920) (section
entitled ''Estoppel As a Substitute for Consideration").
17. Grant Gilmore, THEDEATIiOFCONTRACT(l974).
18. See Hiilman, supra note 9.
19. Sidney W. DeLong, The Ne.... Requirement of Enforcement Reliance in
Commercial Promissory Estoppel: Section 90 as Catdl-22, 1997 WIS. L REv. 943.
20. See Uf. at 981 ("A legion of unhappy plaintiffs can bear witness 10 the
continued vitality of the actual reliance requirement, having discovered thllt a
commercial promise is not alone sufficient to ground n claim under Section 90.").
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consensus" scholars were wrong as a descriptive matter. But, unlike
Hillman, DeLong also tried to discern the factor or factors that might be
needed to tum detrimental reliance in the absence of a bargain into a
successful cause of action.
According to DeLong, his data suggest the existence of two types of
reliance which he called "performance reliance" and "enforcement
reliance.,,21 Performance reliance refers to the trust that a promisee puts
in the promisor to perform his promise. For many reasons, wholly apart
from the perception of enforceability, the promisee believes that the
promise will be performed. Enforcement reliance, by contrast, refers to
reliance on a promise that a promisee reasonably believes to be made
with the intention of being legally binding. DeLong suggests a norm
may be developing that limits promissory estoppel recoveries to
enforcement reliance. 22 If this is so, it means that to succeed in making a
promissory estoppel claim you need "detrimental reliance plus
something"-and that "something" is a manifested intention to be
legally bound.23
All this, of course, is purely descriptive (and it is far from clear from
his tone that DeLong approves of the judicial trend he reports). It does
not answer the normative question of whether promissory estoppel
actions should be limited to cases where detrimental reliance can be
proved or should extend to any manifestation of intention to be legally
bound whether bargained-for or not, and whether relied upon or not. I
have suggested elsewhere that this would be a good thing: that
contractual enforcement is justified, prima facie, whenever there has
been a consent to be legally bound, whether explicit or implicit. 24
21. See id. at 953.
22. See id. at 1003.
Many of the opinions reported in 1995 and 1996 lend support to the thesis that,
in order to prevail on a promissory estoppel claim, a commercial promisee
must now demonstrate not only that her reliance was reasonable in light of the
likelihood that the promisor would perform, but also that she had a reasonable
belief that the promise was legally enforceable when made.

Id.
23. See id. at 994 ("[T]he 1995-96 case sample contains several decisions
suggesting that a manifestation of consent to be legally bound may be becoming
essential to liability under Section 90.").
24. Barnett, supra note 3, at 319; Randy E. Barnett, ... And Contractual Consent,
3 S. CAL. lNTERDISC. L.J. 421 (1993); Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems with Contract
as Promise, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1022 (1992); Randy E. Barnett, The Function of
Several Property and Freedom of Contract, 9 Soc. PHIL. & POL'y 62 (1992); Randy
Barnett, The Internal and External Analysis of Concepts, 11 CARDOZO L. REv. 525
(1990). The implications of this claim for contract law doctrine are developed in: Randy
E. Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 Soc. PHIL. & POL'y 179 (1986);
Randy E. Barnett, Rational Bargaining Theory and Contract: Default Rules,
Hypothetical Consent, the Duty to Disclose, and Fraud, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y
783 (1992); Randy E. Barnett, Squaring Undisclosed Agency Law with Contract Theory,
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In sum, the existence of a manifested intention to be legally bound is
what might, as a descriptive matter, and ought to, as a normative matter,
separate the detrimental reliance that justifies legal relief from the
detrimental reliance that does not. And no theorist has ever advocated
compensating all and every form of detrimental reliance on the words
and deeds of another. Instead, they have advocated basing recovery on
reasonable, justified, or foreseeable reliance. But the next question
immediately to be answered has always been: What exactly (or even
approximately) constitutes the circumstances that make reliance
reasonable, justified, or foreseeable so as to render the promise
enforceable? It cannot be the presence of reliance since reliance is
present in all such cases. In other words, a purely "reliance theory"
cannot explain when detrimental reliance gives rise to a recovery and
when it does not. Reliance theorists have been either silent or vague in
their answers to this question.
In the interest of putting some doctrinal meat on these theoretical
bones, both in my Death of Reliance article and in the first edition of my
casebook, I formulated a series of hypothetical Restatement sections that
might provide more guidance to courts than the current sections 71 and
90.25 The first of these, section 71A, accepted as the starting point the
proposal of Farber and Matheson that: "A promise is enforceable when
made in furtherance of an economic activity."Uj Any promise made
between commercial parties would be presumed enforceable unless there
was some expressed or implied-in-fact disclaimer of liability. The
second, section 71B, established the reverse default rule in cases of
noncommercial promises. Such promises would be unenforceable
unless supported by a formality manifesting an intention to be legally
bound. In section ?lC, I described circumstances in which the existence
of substantial reliance would itself indicate to the promisee that a
promisor intended her promise to be legally binding. And finally. in
section ?lD, I proposed that a promise meeting the requirements of
sections 71A-C might still be unenforceable if the promisor could show
that a reasonable promisee would not have understood the promisor to
have intended the promise to be legally binding.
Upon further reflection, I have been persuaded that this scheme runs
75 CAL. L. REv. 1969 (1987).
25. See Barnett, supra note 1, at 529-36; RANDy E. BARNE1T, CO!'>'TRACfS: CAsES
AND DOC1RINE 906-15 (1st ed. 1995).
26. Barnett, supra note 1, at 539.
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the risk of overenforcement. The problem is its starting point: replacing
the requirement of bargained-for consideration with the rebuttable
presumption that any commercial promise should be enforced. I now
think, and Sidney DeLong's study confirms that courts may think
likewise, that too many promises not intended to be legally binding or
reasonably taken as such by promisees would be enforced if this default
rule were adopted. What is needed is not the overthrow of the bargain
requirement but, like section 90 itself, a supplement to compensate for
the underinclusiveness of section 71-though one that is more definite
and theoretically clear than the extraordinarily open-ended section 90.
In the second edition of my casebook,28 I replaced the fourfold
alternative to both sections 71 and 90 with the following substitute only
for section 90:
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONTRACfS
§90. ENFORCEABILITY OF NONBARGAIN PROMISES
In the absence of consideration as defined in §71, a promise is binding if
(1) the promise is accompanied by a formality that manifests an intention to
be legally bound, such as:
(a) a seal or
(b) the recital of a nominal consideration or
(c) an expression of intention to be legally bound, or
(d) copies of a writing sent to both the promisor and the promisee and
bearing the signatures of both parties; or
(2) with the knowledge of the promisor, the promise induces reliance by the
promisee
(a) that is so substantial that it would be unlikely in the absence of a
manifested intention by the promisor to be legally bound ... and,
(b) the promisee expects the promise to be enforceable and is aware that
the promisor has knowledge of the promisee's reliance, and
29
(c) the promisor remains silent concerning the promisee's reliance.

The idea here is twofold. Allow enforcement based on bargained-for
commitments (which typically manifest an intention to be legally bound)
to be supplemented by those nonbargained-for commitments that,
whether by formalities or substantial reliance, also manifest an intention
to be legally bound. I do not contend that this will capture the whole of
what promissory estoppel doctrine currently enforces. But it does
capture the aspect of promissory estoppel that sounds in contract. Most
notably, it excludes the proportionately small number of cases now
27. See Christopher Wonnell, Expectation, Reliance, and The Two Contractl/a/
Wrongs, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 53, 122-23 (2001).
28.
29.
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handled by promissory estoppel that properly sound in lorl. Mary
Becker and I proposed an expansion of the tort of promissory
misrepresentation to include not only lies-when-made, but also
statements that recklessly or negligently misrepresent the reliability of
the promise.30 This was the theory that we contended best explained the
recovery in Red Owfi just as we contended that Goodman v. Dickern
was also a negligent misrepresentation case, not a case of breach of
contract.
Of course all this presupposes that it matters whether promissory
estoppel sounds in contract or in tort. The virtue of making such a
categorical distinction has long been questioned by legal realists.
Recently, Charles Knapp has responded to The Dealh of Reliance and
the "new consensus" articles on which it was based in a lengthy and
complicated article running nearly 150 journal pages.') In a section
entitled "Felix Unger Cleans House: Reliance Refurbished,' .." he takes
issue with my original fourfold doctrinal proposal. He also questions the
merits of my effort with Mary Becker to distinguish the contractual from
the tortious aspects of promissory estoppel doctrine, and my insistence
that consent to be legally bound is what characterizes the contract side of
the doctrinal divide. ''Why this contract/tort line is such a sore spot with
commentators like Barnett," writes Knapp, "has never been clear to

me.,,3S

Knapp concludes by disparaging the "first-year-of-Iaw-school
mentality [that] insists on compartmentalizing fraud with torts, even
though anecdotal empirical evidence suggests that many torts teachers
spend little or no time on it.,,36 Moreover, he says:
The insistence on doctrinal purity by Barnett and others smacks of nothing so

30. Barnett & Becker, supra note 4, at 485-95.
31. Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
32. 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
33. Knapp, supra note 6. Professor Knapp's extensive discussion of the role of
reliance in contract merits a far more careful and lengthy analysis than I can give it here.
34. Id. at 1233-44.
35. Id. at 1243.
36. Id. at 1244. That first-year tort teachers spend little or no time on fraud is an
argument for contracts professors to cover fraud at least briefly to contrast it with the
defense of misrepresentation, as I do in my casebook. BARNEtT. sllpra note 28. at 107179. It is not an argument for eliminating the doctrinal distinction between fraud and
misrepresentation or between tort and contract Similarly. my casebook includes a
section on agency since it is so rarely covered by teachers of corporations. See id. at
572-96. This does not argue for collapsing the distinction between contract and agency.
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much as the compulsive tidiness of a bunch of academic Felix Ungers, so intent
on neat ordering that they ignore the uses to which the lawyering Oscar
Madisons of the real world may put these doctrines. People make promises,
people break promises, other people get hurt. Is this tort? Is this contract? As
Karl Llewellyn once pungently remarked, "What the helI!"37

Professor Knapp does not really object to tidiness in drafting legal
texts. For example, he suggests modest improvements to the precise
language of my proposed Restatement sections. "At the very least (I
know this sounds like nit-picking here-indulge me)," he writes, "a
better-drafted subsection [71(a)] would have begun, like so many other
sections of the Restatement and the u.e.e., with the cautionary phrase,
'Except as provided in this section .... ",38 This concern for drafting
tidiness is only natural, as Professor Knapp is a contracts lawyer,
teacher, scholar, and the author of a wonderful contracts casebook. So
my suggestion to improve the scope of section 90 cannot really be
dismissed because it is tidy. Rather, Knapp must be concerned that it is
tidy in an inappropriate way. His expressed concern-that 1 ignore the
way lawyers in the world might use these doctrines-is inapt. The entire
reason to tidy up the doctrine is to prevent lawyers (and judges) in the
real world from abusing imprecise, ambiguous, or misguided language.
The focus, then, is on whether we should preserve a realm of law for
obligations voluntarily undertaken, because their very voluntariness
creates a range of opportunities and benefits that cannot be obtained in
the absence of consensual transactions.
One wonders: if the distinction between tort and contract were really
so unimportant, why have academics been trying for decades to tear
down the doctrinal wall between them? The answer is apparent.
Contractual obligation has traditionally been thought to originate in the
consent of the parties, and traditional contract doctrine reflects this. Tort
obligations are imposed upon the parties by the law regardless of their
consent. Hostility to the contract/tort distinction stems from a desire to
abolish consent as the fount of contract and impose all obligations on
parties. This hostility to consent was nowhere more clearly manifested
than in the case of In Re Baby "M,,39 when the New Jersey Supreme
Court held a surrogacy contract to be against public policy. Responding
to the contention that the surrogate mother "agreed to the surrogacy
agreement," the court wrote: "[W]e suggest that her consent is

37. Knapp, supra note 6, at 1244 (citing KARL LLEWELLYN, PUT IN HIS THUMB 3940 (1931». I take no umbrage at the "Felix Unger" epithet. Professor Knapp tried to be
witty in all his section headings. And the first time I read the article, for a brief moment
I thought this section was going to be about Roberto Unger, not me.
38. [d. at 1239-40.
39. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
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irrelevant.',40 Not lacking, not vitiated, not overridden by conflicting
considerations, but irrelevant.
Rendering consent irrelevant to contract is the reason to tear down the
wall between contract and tort. It is a concern for freedom of contract
that motivates many of those who care about the contract/tort distinction,
not some "doctrinal purity" or "compulsive tidiness." And I suggest that
the reverse is true as well. Those who are indifferent to the distinction
between contract and tort are, at best, indifferent to the freedom of
contract that this distinction tries to preserve. Neither of these
arguments is random, but I have from the beginning made my normative
basis explicit-leading Professor Knapp to refer to my "libertarian
principles.''''!
The problem for Knapp and other adherents to a general "reliance
theory" of contract, which I say again has never been systematically
articulated, is that the normal rules of contract law-both of contract
formation and of defenses to enforcement-are themselves pretty
"libertarian" or "c1assicalliberal." Thus, these rules need to be blurred
and eroded if one is to accomplish "progressive" ends that violate
libertarian or c1assicalliberal means.
If DeLong is right, then despite its open-ended formulation, section 90
has done little damage to the principle of freedom of contract and, by
counteracting the underenforcement of the bargain theory of
consideration, has actually done some good. Nevertheless, I believe we
can and should do better. It is dangerous to individual parties to leave
the loaded gun of section 90 lying casually around for some judicial
Oscar Madison to pick up and misuse. Whether it is my formulation or
another, we should provide more guidance to courts about the true nature
of promissory estoppel. And this is to protect the same freedom that
contract law generally protects: the ability of parties to consent to
binding obligations giving rise to a right of others to rely on those
obligations.42 If that is "ideological" then so is the drive to deny contract
law of this vital function.
In the symposium that follows, some of the most thoughtful contracts
scholars writing today present their takes on the third challenge to a
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 1249.
Knapp, supra note 6. at 1241.
For a general defense of freedom of contact see RAND'!' E. BARNEtT. THE
S1RUCfURE OF LmERTY: JUSTICE AND TIlE RULE OF LAw 53-57. 65-67. 101-02. 140-41.
154-55 (1998).
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"reliance theory" of contract that I did not claim to be the subject of a
consensus back in 1996: the import and coherence of the "reliance
interest in contract damages." Several of the participants-David
Barnes, Sydney DeLong, and Michael Kelly, for example-have already
participated in this ongoing scholarly debate on the proper role of
reliance. Some are skeptical of the role of reliance; others are more
supportive. Whether this new skepticism of the reliance interest in
contract damages represents a "new consensus," I will not say. For the
time being, at least, I am out of the consensus-identifying business.
If this Symposium is any indication, reliance is still very much alive as
a concern of contract theorists. It was ever thus. Nevertheless, most of
what follows concerning the proper measure of damages for breaching
an enforceable commitment is consistent with my basic thesis. While
reliance remains a fundamental principle or end of contract law, as it
always has been, it is consent to be legally bound that provides the
essential means to the end of protecting the right to rely on the
commitments of others and to other vital ends as well.
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